Abstract In this study, we report experimental results on the dictator decision collected in two neighboring ethnic minority groups, the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi, in southwestern China. We follow the double-blind protocol as in Eckel and Grossman (in Handbook of experimental economics results, 1998), who find that women in the U.S. donate more than men. We find this pattern reversed in the Mosuo society and find no gender difference in the Yi society. This is highly suggestive that societal factors play an important role in shaping the gender differences in pro-social behavior such as dictator giving. 
Introduction
Gender differences in social preferences like altruism, inequality aversion, trust and cooperation are salient issues in social science studies for their relevance in cooperation, public good provision, voting, and the labor market, among other domains. Echoing Charles Darwin's (1871) statement, most studies in social and behavioral science find women to be more socially oriented (selfless) and men to be more individually orientated (selfish), although the social preferences of women are more context-specific. 1 Instead of the existence of universal gender differences, an even more important question is about which determining factors are behind them. The answers to this question affect our fundamental understanding of assumptions on preferences in traditional economic theory, and entails strong implications for anti-discrimination policies, such as affirmative action.
In particular, we wish to examine the influence of culture, especially that of gender-specific social and economic activities that may vary across cultures, on gender differences in social preferences. After all, man and woman are often assigned different roles throughout their lives, in society in general as well as in family in particular. Is it possible that their inclination regarding social preferences is ingrained by their gender-specific socialization processes in general? As almost all related experiments are conducted in Western countries with similar economic and cultural backgrounds, to tackle this issue, we need to look for evidence over a variety of cultures that vary sufficiently in how the roles for man and woman are defined. Following this approach, Gneezy et al. (2009) find that women display higher inclination to competition than men in the matrilineal Khasi society in India, while the opposite is true in the patriarchal Maasai tribe in Tanzania, as in the Western patriarchal societies.
In this study, we duplicate the double-anonymous dictator experiment of Eckel and Grossman (1998) and Hoffman et al. (1994) in two neighboring ethnic minority groups, the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi, in a secluded high-mountain region in southwest China. "Uncle in charge of etiquette and mother in charge of finance" is the traditional Mosuo gender role specification.
2 Money, and management of the household, is traditionally an exclusive female domain among the Mosuo. Although not all Mosuo women become household head eventually, they all have a chance at early age and thus are trained to be canny. Men, on the other hand, play more active roles in social activities and practice the act of gift giving more often, partially due to the customs of the walking marriage.
3 In such an arrangement, the man never leaves his mother's household his entire life. He puts all his income into the family account and gets 'pocket money' from the household head for his various social needs. 4 Opposite to the Mosuo, the Yi lineage and property inheritance are exclusively based on the male line, quite exactly the same as the other close-by Naxi people that are closer relatives to the Mosuo. Although the social status for women is low in this sense, the Yi men and women share household responsibilities to the extent that they are both conscious of the household economics. As family head the Yi man makes the big household decisions, but Yi women are those who make everyday expenditure decisions. 5 Both cultures differ from the Western stereotype of men being more financially accountable and women being more social, which provide exogenously different social/economic impact at subgroup level within a society. In addition, as neighbors, the Mosuo and the Yi are otherwise comparable regarding their general economic, social, and political environments. Moreover, they are genetically closely related along the matrilineal lineage, regarding the mtDNA characteristics.
6 Therefore, we would not expect nature to result in any difference in gender differences among the two societies. A more detailed description of the two societies can be found in our Appendix 2 of ESM.
We pick the dictator game because it provides the cleanest testing ground for gender difference in social preferences by eliminating any strategic and risk issues, as argued by Eckel and Grossman (1998) . In this game, two subjects are randomly paired and one of them (the dictator) decides how to split a certain amount (usually $10 for American undergraduate students) between them. The other player (recipient) plays a completely passive role and the usual anonymous design assures the dictator no future sanction from the recipient. Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that women donate about twice as much as men in a double-anonymous design. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) , Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) , Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Dufwenberg and Astri (2004a) also find that women split the money more equally in variations of the dictator game. However, Bolton and Katok (1995) , Dufwenberg and Astri (2004b) and Ben-Ner et al. (2004) find no significant gender difference in the none-double-blind dictator game. Henrich et al. (2005) find no significant gender difference in the 15 small-scale societies.
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Footnote 4 continued early morning, and has no financial obligation to his partner and children except that voluntary gift-giving is common. Children are raised by the mother's family and the uncles play the farther's role. This unique feature distinguishes the Mosuo from other well-known matrilineal cultures like the Khasi in India. Note, conventional marriage has become an option due to various sorts of outside influence in the last 50 years. However, there is no evidence showing that this option has impacted the cultural education of gender roles. We refer to Appendix B.3 of ESM for additional survey results. See Shih (2000) and Latami (2006) for further discussions. 5 According to Yuan (1992, p. 144), 46.23, 35.18, and 14.57 % of 199 Yi families surveyed in a 1988 study had either the husband or the wife or both of them in charge of household finance, respectively. Also see Harrell (2001a, b) for more discussion on the Yi. 6 Along the patrilineal lineage, however, the Mosuo are more related to the Tibetans, which reflects the influence of Lamaism in the Mosuo culture. See Wen et al. (2004) for a comprehensive genetic marker study, with further discussions of ethnic migrations. 7 All these results are based on the above standard DG, where the dictator forgoes the same amount of money for every dollar given to the recipient. When giving becomes cheaper, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) shows that gender difference can be reversed, which implies that men might care more about efficiency while women care more about equality. In this paper we would like to put aside the efficiency concern and focus on equality and altruism.
Unlike Eckel and Grossman (1998) , we find no gender difference in the patriarchal Yi society. And most strikingly, we observe that men donate more than twice what women do in the matrilineal Mosuo society, reversing the direction of gender difference that Darwin would call natural. This is different from the results in all previous dictator experiments we are aware of. Such findings are consistent with our expectations given the differences in socio-economic gender roles among these cultures.
In Sect. 2, we will discuss our design and implementation of the experiment. Section 3 summarizes the data analysis. Conclusions and further interpretations can be found in the last section.
Experimental design and implementation details

Design
We implement a double-blind procedure closely following Eckel and Grossman (1998) and Hoffman et al. (1994) with minor modifications. 8 In each session, we have 7 subjects of the same gender who will play the dictators.
9 As in Eckel and Grossman (1998), same-gender sessions are used because recording the individual gender in a mixed-gender session runs the danger of compromising anonymity.
Everybody receives 5 RMB as a show-up fee right after the reading of the instructions and then randomly draws a sealed envelope from seven. Six envelopes are filled with 10 one-RMB bills and 10 blank slips of paper, while one is only filled with 10 blank slips of paper to make it visually indistinguishable from the other six.
10 Then, the dictators one by one go behind a curtain alone to take any amount of money they want. They then drop the envelope with money left for the recipients into a locked box and leave. After all dictators are done, the experimenter opens the box in a private place, records the content of each envelope, and then gives them to 8 In Hoffman et al. (1994) , subjects on average gave about $2.7 in the standard dictator game but only $0.9 in the double blind 1 design, which suggests that anonymity is extremely crucial in such experiments. 9 Due to scarcity of subjects, ours differs from Eckel and Grossman (1998) which assigns 14 samegender dictators and one monitor to each session. 10 The purpose of having one envelop without money in each session is to make it possible for the recipients receiving no money to guess that maybe the dictator did not get money in the first place, so that the dictators will not feel as guilty if they take all the money. Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) provide the theoretical foundation and supporting experimental evidence that by changing the observability of the dictator choice (e.g. the ratio of empty envelopes) one can affect the donations systematically. That implies our higher ratio of empty envelopes than that in Eckel and Grossman (1998) might give our subjects more moral wiggle room to give less.
A minor difference on execution is that Eckel and Grossman (1998) require the total number of bills and paper slips each subject takes out to be exactly 10, which we did not find feasible in our field environment. Consequently, it becomes obsolete to also copy their feature of having 20 slips of paper in the no-money envelop. Since the paper we used was thicker than money, envelopes with and without money did not look very different. the recipients in another place. We mention in the instructions that the recipients will also receive 5 RMB as a show-up fee, and they are sampled from villages of the same ethnic population as the current donors', to avoid potential cross-ethnicity effect. The dictators do not know the gender of the recipients. Since they can see there are both men and women participating our experiment, although not in the same session, they are likely to guess that the recipients are a mixture of men and women.
Note that the daily income for average working Mosuo and Yi would be 3RMB to 4RMB, according both to official statistics and our own polls. Our 5RMB showup fee and 10RMB dictator endowment for a 40-min experiment are very high indeed, comparable to those in Gneezy et al. (2009) .
Recruiting and implementation
We ran 24 sessions in total, with 14 Mosuo and 10 Yi ones. Male and female experimenters read instructions in equal numbers of male-and female-dictator sessions, while experimenters of both genders were present in all sessions. Table 1 summarizes the exact session composition.
Our recruitment message emphasized monetary rewards with no hint of the specific contents of the experiment, through village heads and local helpers. The villagers were simply told that they could earn at least 5RMB and probably more. Our sessions were conducted at different locations.
All the Mosuo sessions plus the two pilots were conducted within 5 consecutive days, on a trip in November 2007. Nine were run at the Yongning town hall facing the marketplace, where the subjects were recruited. The other five sessions were conducted in a nearby village in one morning. 11 The sessions with Yi subjects were conducted on a second trip in July 2008, in three villages at least 30 min' drive away from Yongning town. The sessions in each location were done in half a day. Subjects waited in a classroom, or on the open ground where instructions for the ongoing session could not be heard. Whenever a subject finished her or his part in the experiment, she or he was asked to leave the site immediately, to avoid any interaction with the waiting subjects.
Other than conducting the experiment, we also collected individual demographic data of our dictator subjects as well as a bigger subject pool of over 1,000 (summarized in the Appendix 2 of ESM). Table 2 summarizes the answers to the most important questions by the dictator subjects. Male and female dictators within ethnic groups are very similar, except that males are slightly more educated and there are slightly more female than male Mosuo peasants. Rank-sum tests show that the demographic characteristics of dictators are not significantly different from that of the bigger sample.
Instructions
For the Mosuo sessions, we hired two native interpreters to orally translate our Chinese instructions into the Mosuo language. We did the standard double checking beforehand by having one interpreter translate the other's Mosuo translation back into Mandarin, following Gneezy et al. (2009) . In the experiment, we read out instructions in Mandarin and then played the recorded Mosuo translation, paragraph by paragraph. For the Yi experiments, since Yi people understand Mandarin quite well, we read instructions in Mandarin ourselves and asked local assistants to repeat them in the Yi language, after carefully making sure that the latter perfectly understood the instructions. In addition, to enhance the task comprehension, we also accompanied the instruction with purely demonstrative gestures, such as inserting the envelope in the slit of the locked box. Relative life condition is a variable between 1 and 5 indicating a subject's life condition compared to nearby people, where 1 means very good and 5 means very bad. Due to feasibility issue, two Yi groups failed to fill the questionnaire other hand, Yi women and men donated about the same amounts. The MannWhitney test shows significant gender difference in the Mosuo at p = 0.003 and no gender difference among the Yi (p = 0.795). Mosuo men also donated significantly more than both Yi men and Yi women (p = 0.038). 13 Mosuo women donated less than both Yi women and Yi men, but the difference is not statistically significant. These results are in support of our hypothesis.
Data analysis
Note that the glaring gender gap in education among the Mosuo cannot be a salient reason for the reverse gender difference we find among the Mosuo, because the Yi has an even bigger such gap.
Regarding the potential experimenter effect, 14 the Mosuo women donated 1.75 RMB on average with the male instructor, but only 0.89 with the female instructor. The difference is significant by the Mann-Whitney test at the 10 % level (p = 0.081). Also, different-gender experimenters seem to induce higher donation than same-gender ones in the overall Yi data (p = 0.058). Yet, probably due to smaller sample sizes, this is not the case when we look at Yi women or Yi men separately (p = 0.282 and p = 0.121, respectively).
For more details, Fig. 1 displays the distributions of donations by Mosuo men and women separately. Note that women chose 0 nearly twice as often as men and men chose 5 RMB twice as often as women did. No women donated over 5, while more than 15 % of men did so, among whom one donated 8, three did the whole 10, and two even donated 15 by including their 5RMB show-up fee.
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Figure 2 presents the distributions of donations by Yi subjects. At each donation level, the numbers of male and female dictators are similar. Table 4 summarizes two random-session effects censored Tobit regressions, one for each ethnicity, to control for potential session and experimenter effects as robustness tests for the gender-difference observations. Mosuo men donate significantly more than Mosuo women even when we control for experimenter, voter dummy and interaction of subjects' gender and the experimenter's. All effects other than subjects' gender are far from significant in the Mosuo data. The regression also reiterates the result of no gender difference in the Yi. The only significant factor for the Yi is experimenter's gender being different from the subjects', consistent with the non-parametric test reported above. Putting both Gender differences in the dictator experiment 309 ethnic groups into the regression, we get significant difference in gender difference among the two societies. Mosuo men are significantly more generous than all the other groups. As a whole, our results again support our hypothesis.
Conclusions and discussions
The Mosuo have a matrilineal society with some special features: women are in charge of economic decision making in households, while men engage more in activities beyond agriculture and the household. Using the double-anonymity design, we observe that the typical gender difference in the dictator game is reversed among the Mosuo: Mosuo men donate more than twice as much as Mosuo women. In comparison, no gender difference is found among the neighboring patriarchal Yi. Such results support our hypothesis that culture induced, and thus exogenous, gender differences in social and economic roles play a crucial role in shaping gender differences in pro-social behavior such as dictator giving. The fact that the Mosuo and the Yi are genetically closely related further strengthens this conclusion. In particular, how much responsibility for economic decisions one shoulders in the household and how much social interaction one engages in may be major determinants that affect the giving behavior. Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) contend that need for social approval be behind dictator giving. Yet, Dana et al. (2007) show evidence that people actively exploit the "moral wiggle room" to avoid the felt duty of pro-social behavior in a modified dictator game, i.e. all they need is "an excuse to not have to give". The duty to provide for one's own family before helping others offers such an excuse to Mosuo women, especially in a double-blind dictator game. Mosuo men, on the other hand, do not have this excuse. They not only do not share the same responsibilities, but also are far more involved in social activities, take more non-peasantry jobs, and practice gift-giving more regularly. In contrast, Yi women share the economic responsibility for the household with men, and Yi men are not as involved in social activities and gift-giving as Mosuo men Standard error in parentheses * p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01 are. Thus, the reason for reverse gender difference among the Mosuo is absent with the Yi. Note that our explanation of economic decision making with role differences can also be linked to the psychological literature on entitlement. Societal norms and gender roles are among the main causes of the gender differences in pay entitlement, as argued by Major (1989 Major ( , 1993 among others. In particular, the literature on gender stereotypes and the socialization of children shows that the world of money is "sex-typed'' as more of a male domain in Western societies. Thus, it is a natural consequence that women would feel less entitled in the monetary realm in the West, according to Babcock and Laschever (2003) . 16 Our theory is also in line with Henrich et al.'s (2005 Henrich et al.'s ( , 2010 finding that the level of socio-economic interaction positively covaries with fairness preferences, which suggests that "modern prosociality is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but also reflects norms and institutions that have emerged over the course of human history". 17 In their study, such reflection is at the society level. Our study goes one step further by showing that social norms may cause systematically different behavior of subgroups (differentiated by gender in our story) within a society, and different gender-specific social norms may result in significantly different gender differences across societies.
Complementary to this argument, we would like to clarify that it might be misleading to treat matrilineality as the sole source of explanation for the striking finding of reversed gender effect in Gneezy et al. (2009) as well as our study, without further scrutiny. In fact, Zhang (2013) finds that among both the matrilineal Mosuo and patriarchal Yi, high school boys were significantly more likely to compete in a tournament than the girls, while no gender difference is found among the patriarchal Han Chinese. Different policies and social norms regarding women labor participation between the majority Han and the minority ethnic groups have been found responsible.
